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The discussions on sovereignty which were so prominent in the times
of Austin and his successors have in our own day gone somewhat
out of fashion, and the tendency of modem writers is to maintain that
the word "sovereignty" is too ambiguous to form a profitable subject
of legal analysis. I venture to think that in some respects this tendency
has gone too far. Different theories of sovereignty have actually exer-
cised a most important influence upon the practical solution of prob-
lems of government, and in particular upon the problem of the relation
of the courts to legislation.
In the United States the theory that sovereignty resides only in
"the people" is indicated with sufficient clearness in the preamble to
the constitution and in the tenth amendment So far as the federal
constitution is concerned, the doctrine has been suffered to remain
expressed in general terms, and no attempt has been made to indicate
with precision the agencies through which the sovereignty of the people
may find its legal expression. In a number of individual states the
problem has been worked out in greater detail, and an effort has been
made to give a legal form to the doctrine of popular sovereignty in the
constitutional provisions for the initiative, referendum, and recall. Both
in the federal and in the state constitutions the practical result of the
doctrine is to be found in the general agreement that the powers of all
legislatures are inherently and essentially limited in relation" to the sub-
ject-matter of legislation itself. American political theory has not con-
tented itself with asserting that doctrine of the distribution of powers
which is necessary' to any truly federal system of government. It has
gone farther, and has continually assumed that there are certain activi-
ties which lie outside the proper province of all legislative bodies. A
general acceptance of this theory appears in nearly all the political writ-
ings of the revolutionary period, and it has found expression in judi-
cial opinions almost from the beginning of the Republic. When
Marshall rendered his classic decision in Marbury v. Madison, the
political criticism of the day was directed, not against the claim of the
Supreme Court to define and limit the powers of Congress, but against
its alleged encroachment upon the proper-field of the executive power.
From the time of the revolution down to our own day a distrust of legis-
lative activity has exercised a marked influence over all American thought
and action, and the more recent constitutions of some states have given
a legal expression to this distrust in an extreme form which would
a (1803, U. S.) I Cranch, 137.
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have been neither dreamed of nor tolerated by Hamilton and his con-
temporaries.
In sharp contrast with this doctrine the constitutional development of
Great Britain and of all the British Dominions has proceeded since
the middle of the eighteenth century upon the theory of the sovereignty
of parliament. The sovereignty of the people is not denied in our
modern political thought, but it is regarded as a principle of politics
rather than as a rule of constitutional law. The will of the people can
only find legal expression through the acts of the legislature, and the
duty of the legislature to obey the will of the people is a duty imposed,
not by law, but by political morality and practical expediency.
So far as the parliament of Great Britain is concerned little need
be said. More than three hundred years have passed since Coke
delivered himself of his well-known dictum that the courts could declare
null a statute which violated "common right and reason." This theory
obtained a certain amount of political currency in the seventeenth cen-
tury and was not without its influence upon the political thought of
the American revolution, but no English court of law has ever ven-
tured in practice to assume such a liberty, and the government of the
country has proceeded uniformly upon the principle laid down by
Blackstone2 in unqualified terms, that "the power of parliament is abso-
lute and without control." In the more pungent language of a modem
judge3 it is said that "the legislature cannot make evil good, but it can
make it not actionable."
The modern development of completely autonomous legislatures in
the overseas Dominions has created new problems. Previous to the
establishment of the Dominion of Canada in 1867 the.doctrine of parlia-
mentary sovereignty supplied a means for controlling colonial legis-
latures by executive action which rendered it seldom necessary to invoke
the assistance of the courts of law.4
If the cabinet in London considered that any particular colonial
statute was undesirable on grounds of policy, they could abrogate it
either by refusing the royal assent or by disallowing it after it had
passed. If they deemed it desirable as a matter of policy, but were
doubtful about the competence of the colony to enact it; then the
difficulty could be solved by the aid of an imperial statute. Whatever
happened the whole matter was under the effective control of the
executive authorities in London, and in practice it was hardly ever
necessary to bring the question before the courts.
21 Cooley's Blackstone (2d ed. 1872) 159; see also Bonham's Case (161o, K B.)
8 Co. Rep. II3b, 1ISa, and 4 Coke, Institutes (79') 36
'Farwell, L. J., in Conway v. Wade [igoS, C. A.] 2 K. B. 844, 856.
' In a few instances in the eighteenth century the Privy Council declared colonial
statutes to be ultra vires. It must, however, be remembered that at that time the
Privy Council was as much an executive as a judicial body.
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A statute of I6965 had.declared that colonial legislatures were unable
to legislate in a manner repugnant to any English statute extending
to the colony concerned, but apart from this the exact nature of the
powers possessed by the colonial assemblies was never precisely defined.
Down to the middle of the nineteenth century a vague theory prevailed
that a colony could not pass statutes at variance with the principles of
the common law. This doctrine, which seems to have been' founded
upon a hazy recollection of Coke's dictum, was much too ill-defined
to form the subject of judicial decision, and I am not aware of any
instance in which a colonial statute was declared null upon these
grounds. Whatever it may or may not have meant, it was finally dis-
posed of by the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865,6 which explicitly
declared that no colonial statute 'should be deemed void by reason of
repugnance to the common law, unless it contravened the provisions
of an imperial statute extending in express terms to the colony
concerned.
When a federal system of government was set up in Canada by the
act of I8677 it soon became apparent that the interpretation of the
new constitution was going to provide plenty of work for the
courts. It became necessary to consider the essential nature of legis-
lative power in the overseas Dominions and to determine whether the
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty was confined to the parliament
of Great Britain and Ireland, or whether it had been successfully
transplanted across the oceans to the ends of the earth. After some
years of discussion, this issue was presented squarely to th& Privy
Council in the classical case of Hodge v. The Queen.8 A statute of
the Ontario legislature' had created a board of license commissioners
with power to define offences and prescribe penalties for their viola-
tion, and the appellant contended that a provincial legislature had no
right to delegate to a subordinate body the functions entrusted to it
by the imperial parliament. He claimed that the legislature of Ontario
itself was no more than a local delegate of the, sovereign assembly at
Westminster, and that therefore it was bound to observe the classical
maxim-delegatus non potest delegare. This contention was overruled
by the Privy Council in language which has now gained a permanent
place in the literature of our constitutional law.
"It appears to their Lordships," said Sir Barnes Peacock,10 "that
the objection thus raised by the appellants is founded on an entire
misconception of the true character and position of the provincial legis-
latures. They are in no sense delegates of or acting under any man-
7 & 8 Will. III, c: 22, sec. 9.
'28 & 29 Vict., c. 63, sec. 3.
'30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
(1884, P. C.) L. R. 9 A. C. 117.
'Rev. Sts. Ont. 1877, c. 1SI.'
2'L. R 9 A. C. at p. 132.
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date from the Imperial Parliament. When the British North America
Act enacted that there should be a legislature for Ontario, and that
its legislative assembly should have exclusive authority to make laws
for the Province and for provincial purposes in relation to the matters
enumerated in section 92, it conferred powers not in any sense to be
exercised by delegation from or as agents of the Imperial Parliament,
but authority as plenary and as ample within the limits prescribed by
section 92 as the Imperial Parliament in the plenitude of its power
possessed and could bestow. Within these limits of subjects and area
the local legislature is supreme and has the same authority as the
Imperial Parliament."
In 1885 the same doctrine was re-affirmed in the Australian case
of Powell v. Apollo Candle Co.,11 and it has long since become part
of the current coin of constitutional discussion in the British Empire.
It will easily be seen that this acceptance of the theory that sov-
ereignty is an attribute of all legislatures results in a severe limitation
of the function of the courts. Under the American practice the courts
may declare a statfite to be null on one of two grounds. In the first
place, they may consider that the legislature has invaded the area
reserved by the constitution to another. Secondly, they may declare
that the subject matter of the statute is one wholly beyond the compe-
tence of any legislative body, and is therefore reserved under the
federal tenth amendment or under the state constitution to the sov-
ereign people itself. In other words, they are concerned, not only
with preserving the proper distribution of legislative power, but also
with defining its essential nature.
Where the theory of parliamentary sovereignty prevails, the second
of these functions disappears. In Canada or Australia the work done
by the courts in applying the constitution substantially consists in see-
ing that the various legislatures do not trespass upon each other's
territory. So long as they keep off one another's, preserves they can
do what they please within their own field. In the eye of the law
there is no "sovereign people" which has jealously retained for itself
certain powers that it will not entrust to any legislative assembly.
The sovereignty of the- people is a political fact of which the law takes
no account, and there is no matter in the whole range of human activity
which may not lawfully be dealt with by some law-making body.
The courts have merely to determine which is the proper legislature
to deal with the subject matter of the particular case at bar.
The practical consequences of this doctrine will be readily appre-
ciated by the American reader who is familiar with the actual operation
of judicial control as practiced in his own country. For example.
no argument based upon the doctrine of the "separation of powers"
could be successfully addressed to any tribunal in the British Empire
in attacking the validity of a legislative act. The attempt has been
u (1885, P. C.) L. I. o A. C. 282.
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made, but has been signally defeated. In 1875 the Parliament of
Canada passed an act12 establishing a Supreme Court for the Dominion,
and one of the provisions required the judges to give advisory opinions
upon questions of law submitted to them by the executive government-
precisely what the judges of the United States Supreme Court had
refused to do in 1793.'3 In 1911 the validity of this provision was
attacked at the instance of some of the provincial governments, and
the matter came up before the Privy Council. 4 The appellant pro-
vinces argued that the effect of this enactment was to deprive the
Supreme Court of its purely judicial character by compelling it to act
as an advisory committee of the executive. The language of Lord
Loreburn in delivering the opinion of the Judicial Committee is of
sufficient importance to be quoted at some length.
"It is argued," he said,15 "that the Dominion Act authorizing ques-
tions to be asked of the Supreme Court is an invasion of provincial
rights, but nof because the power of asking such questions belongs
exclusively to the Provinces. The real ground is far wider. It is no
less than this-that no legislature in Canada has the right to pass an
Act for asking such questions at all. This is the feature of the present
appeal which makes it so grave and far-reaching. It would be one
thing to say that under the Canadian Constitution what has been done
could be done only by a provincial legislature within its own Province.
It is quite a different thing to say that it cannot be done at all; being,
as it is, a matter affecting the internal affairs of Canada, and, on the
face of it, regulating the functions of a court of law, which are part'
of the ordinary machinery of government in all civilized coun-
tries .......
"In the interpretation of a completely self-governing Constitution
founded upon a written organic instrument, such as the British North
America Act, if the text is explicit the text is conclusive, alike in what
it directs and in what it forbids. When the text is ambiguous, as for
instance, when the words establishing two mutually exclusive jurisdic-
tions are wide enough to bring a particular power within either, recourse
must be bad to the context and scheme of the Act. Again, if the
text says nothing expressly, then it is not to be presumed that the
Constitution withholds the power altogether. On the contrary, it is
to be taken for granted that the power is bestowed in some quarter
unlecs it be extraneous to the statute itself (as, for example, a power
to make laws for some part of His Majesty's dominions outside of
Canada) or otherwise is clearly repugnant to its sense. For whatever
belongs to self-government in Canada belongs either to the Dominion
or to the Provinces, within the limits of the British North America
Act ......
"What in substance their Lordships are asked to do is to say that
1" In its present form the statute is now Rev. Sts. Can. 19o6, c. 139.
" See Thayer, Legal Essays (i9o8) 53, and cf. Hayburn's Case (1792, U. S.) 2
DalI 409; see also the letter of the Justices of the circuit court for the district
of Pennsylvania to the President of the United States, April 18, 1792, 2 Dail. 411." Atty-Gen. for Ontario v. Atty-Gen. for Canda [1912, P. C.] A. C. 571.
"Ibid. at p. 581 et seq.
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the Canadian- Parliament ought not to pass laws like this because it
may be embarrassing and onerbus to a Court, and to declare this
law invalid because it ought noi to have been passed. Their Lord-
ships would be departing from their legitimate province if they enter-
tained the arguments of the appellants. They would really be pro-
nouncing upon the policy of the Canadian Parliament, which is exclu-
sively the business of the Canadian people, and is no concern of this
Board. It is sufficient to point out the mischief and inconvenience
which might arise from an indiscriminate and mischievous use of the
Act, and leave it to the consideration of those who alone are lawfully
and constitutionally entitled to decide upon such a matter."
So far as the issue is one of strict law, such language really removed
the principle of parliamentary omnipotence from the area of debate.
But there is usually also a political background to the debates on con-
stitutional questions which are staged in the courts of law, and it may
be convenient here to refer to this aspect of the matter. The constitu-
tion of the United States was a compromise embodying the maximum of
verbal agreement that could be attained between two fiercely opposed
schools of political thought. Its real meaning was left to be worked
out by subsequent discussion, and the independence of the country
made it necessary for the questions in dispute to be settled by a purely
domestic tribunal. In these circumstances it was inevitable that the
actual power of decision should fall into the hands of men who had
taken an active part in the political controversies. When Marshall
passed from the federal cabinet to the Supreme Court bench he could
not and did not leave his political opinions in the desk of his executive
office. He merely gave expression to them through a new medium.
In saying this we need not suggest that he was a partial or an unscrupu-
lous judge, but merely that he was sufficiently human to retain a lively
interest in the political development of his country. Fortunately his
views coincided, with the real needs of the United States, and for this
reason his work on the bench became part of the permanent structure
of the constitution. Had his office been filled at the time by a lawyer
of different outlook and personality it is probable that the history of
judicial control in the United States might have run a very different
course.
In Canada also there was a lively, though rather less acrimonious,
conflict between the federalist and the provincial points of view, but
the relation of the country to Great Britain caused the questions at
issue to be settled in a very different atmosphere.. The legal problems
presented to the Privy Council in the first twenty years after con-
federation were largely the expression of a personal struggle between
Sir John Macdonald, the first prime minister of Canada, and Sir Oliver
Mowat, the equally able premier of Ontario. In the debates which
preceded confederation Macdonald had not concealed his own prefer-
ence for a purely unitary scherne of government, and only accepted
the federal solution as the best which could be obtained in the cir-
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cumstances. As Premier of Canada he pressed strongly for the view
that the Dominion Parliament was the only truly sovereign legislature
in Canada, and that the provincial bodies were rather on the footing
of municipal councils enjoying only delegated powers. This doctrine
was condemned in Hodge v. The Queen,16 and on the whole Mowat
was the winner in the long struggle. But the Canadian solution
differed from the American in that the last word lay with men who
had played no part in Canadian political controversy. The English and
Scotch lawyers who sat round a table in an obscure room off Whitehall
to decide the nature of Canadian federalism were able to regard
the issues presented to them with an air of Olympian detachment. No
less than in the case of Marshall or Taney the personal mentality and
political upbringing of the Judicial Committee largely determined the
current of their judicial decisions. But in this personal outlook there
was nothing Canadian. As young men they had learned the orthodox
doctrine of sovereignty from Blackstone and Austin, and their whole
life's work was carried on under the shadow of an omnipotent legis-
lature. The instrument which they had to interpret declared in i~s
preamble that Canada was to have a constitution "similar in principle to
that of the United Kingdom," and the doctrine of parliamentary sov-
ereignty formed the very foundation of all British constitutional
theory. To the political controversies three thousand miles away they
were entirely indifferent, and the vigorous language of Canadian news-
papers was only very faintly echoed in the formal arguments pre-
sented in the cool atmosphere of the council chamber. The American
constitution they looked upon as a novel and curious experiment in
government to be studied mainly for the interest of noting its diver-
gence from the principles with which they were familiar. Their func-
tion was to establish'firmly upon Canadian soil that doctrine of par-
liamentary sovereignty which was of the very essence of British
institutions.
In the thirty-three years which separated the Canadian from the
Australian constitution this fundamental principle was so well settled
as to be placed almost beyond the reach of argument. The Australians
deliberately rejected the Canadian in favour of the American model
when they decided that the general residue of undefined powers should
rest with the States rather than with the Commonwealth, but they
followed the accepted British doctrine in refusing to admit any sov-
ereignty of "the people" that did not find expression in the acts of
some legislature.Y7 The text of the constitution practically eliminates
appeals from the Commonwealth High Court to England in constitu-
tional cases, but the doctrine of Hodge v. The Queen'8 has been accepted
18Supra note 8.The special provisions for taking a referendum upon proposed amendments to
the constitution do not conflict with this general principle.' Supra note 8.
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in full by the Australian courts. "The Federal Parliament," said Mr.
Justice Higgins, "has, within its ambit, full powers- to frame laws in
any fashion, using any agent, any agency, any machinery that in its
wisdom it thinks fit, for the peace, order, and good government of
Australia."'19 As in Canada, the judges are not empowered to limit
the exercise of legislative power except in so far as they may be com-
pelled to define the agencies through which it may be exercised.
The South African constitution of i9o9 needs little comment, since
the South Africans deliberately abandoned the federal idea and created
a purely unitary scheme of government. Except for certain tempo-
rary restrictions there is no constitutional limitation of any kind upon
the legislative power of the Union Parliament, and the provincial
councils are entirely at the mercy of the Parliament, which can enlarge,
restrict, or even abolish their powers at its sole discretion. From
this it follows that in South Africa the courts have really no more
right to interfere with legislative activity than they have in Great
Britain.
So far we have seen the current of constitutional development run
evenly and without deflection. With the constitution of the Irish Free
State,20 established by joint action of the Irish and British legislatures
in 1922, a new element appears. It need hardly be said that the con-
stitution-makers of Dail Eireann had no particular reverence for British
institutions, except in so far as they considered their utility to have
been proved by practical experience, and we shall not be surprised to
find that they were willing to seek inspiration from other sources.
The preamble begins by proclaiming the doctrine of popular sov-
ereignty in the form that "all lawful authority comes from God to
the people," but it will be noted that here again there is no reservation
of any powers to "the people" that cannot be expressed through appro-
priate legislative forms. A very real limitation of legislative power
is contained in the proviso which follows, to the effect that the whole
instrument and any laws made under it must be construed with refer-
ence to the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921 and are void in so far as they
are in conflict with that agreement. As a matter of history we know
that this limitation was inserted under pressure from England, and it
would presumably be disregarded if at any time Dail Eireann chose
to take the view that the treaty had ceased to be binding.
The sixth and seventh articles of the constitution provide for liberty
of the person and the inviolability of the dwelling, but since each of
these liberties is qualified by the words "except in accordance with
law," there is presumably no real limitation of legislative power.
Furthermore there is a significant reservation of the right to take any
military action which may become necessary during a state of war
or armed rebellion.
"Baxter v. Ah Way (i9o9, H. Ct Aust) 8 Comm. L. X. 626, 646.
'12 &.13 Geo. V, sess. 2, c. i.
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The eighth article contains a definite guarantee of freedom of con-
science and worship, qualified only by the words "subject to public
order and morality." It goes on to prohibit in unqualified terms all
forms of religious endowment or religious discrimination, and is a real
abridgment of the power of the legislature, though of course it could
be abolished by constitutional amendment, if the treaty with Great
Britain should ever cease to be operative. The limitation has been
drafted with a careful attention to detail which will probably serve to
eliminate the difficult problems that have arisen under the more loosely
worded prohibitions in some American state constitutions.
The right of free speech ahd public meeting is preserved by the
ninth article in so far as it is employed "for purposes not opposed
to public morality." In practice it may be expected that this article
will not seriously interfere with any powers which the legislature may
wish to exercise, since the courts will undoubtedly hold that the legis-
lature is the sole judge of what comes under the head of "public
morality."
The tenth article declares, without going into detail, that all citizens
have the right to free elementary education, and the eleventh prohibits
the legislature from alienating the public domain for any longer
period than ninety-nine years.
The forty-third article prohibits the passing of ex post facto laws
in criminal matters, and the seventy-second preserves the right of
trial by jury in criminal cases of the graver kind.
Taking these provisions as a whole, we see at once a faint reflection
of the American doctrine of limited legislative power as compared with
the strict theory of British parliamentary sovereignty. But the
American reader who compares these restrictions with the long list of
prohibitions addressed to his own legislatures by the federal and state
constitutions will be more impressed by the Irish unwillingness to
impose any checks upon the power of lawmaking which are at all
likely to be seriously felt in practice. The significance of this decision
will be the more apparent when it is remembered that the draftsmen
of the Irish constitution did not share the traditional reverence of
the Canadians and Australians for British institutions, but were rather
concerned to emphasise the independent character of their own work.
Since no questions of a federal nature can arise in the Free State, we
may expect that in practice the Irish judges will have little or no
opportunity of actually controlling the decisions of the legislature.
Except for the limitation imposed by the terms of the treaty with
Great Britain, the full doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has been
substantially preserved.
Broadly speaking, it is true to say that the "British Commonwealth
of Nations,' 2 1 notwithstanding the immense diversity of its constituent
'This phrase has now obtained legal recognition through its adoption in the
Irish Constitution.
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elements, has been practically unanimous in rejecting the theory that
it is the function of the courts to protect "the people" from the encroach-
ments of the legislature. Whether this theory be right or wrong, it
clearly must stand as an original contribution to political thought of
distinctively American origin. Under the British scheme of govern-
ment the general doctrine is that the judges have no control over the
policy of Parliament, except when they are called upon to decide
between the conflicting claims of rival legislatures in a federal system.
If they hold that a particular statute is ultra vires, then the result auto-
matically follows that it must fall within the proper competence of
some other assembly. The current of law-making power may be
diverted, but it cannot be prevented from flowing, as soon as it has
found its proper channel, and the only real corrective for legislative
folly is that which the suffrage places in the hands of the people
themselves.
